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Coldicott: Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program

NOTE

OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL
V. THOMAS; ANOTHER "MERITORIOUS"
TIMBER LAWSUIT FAILS: DO SUBSTANTIVE
RIDERS WARRANT AN EXCEPTION TO THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE RULE?
"We consider what would appear to be
a relatively straightforward question
of statutory interpretation
with fairly profound consequences." l

I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 27,1995, President William J. Clinton signed into
law the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy That Occurred at
Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act. 2 Although the Rescissions Act was primarily an appropriations bilV it contained
several provisions aimed at expediting the award of timber
1. Opening quote written by Ninth Circuit Judge Michael Hawkins in Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1996)
(NFRC). See infra Part II.C.l.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-19, 2001-2007, 109 Stat. 194, 240-47 (1995) (the Rescissions Act or the Act).
3. An appropriations bill is a measure before a legislative body authorizing
the expenditure of public moneys and stipulating the amount, manner and purpose
of the various items of expenditure. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 102 (6th ed. 1990).

1
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harvesting contracts. 4 These provisions authorized the nationwide release of salvage timber sales,5 expedited the award of
timber sales covered in the President's Northwest Forest
Plan,6 and released previously authorized timber sales. 7
The Act prohibited administrative review and provided for
only limited judicial review of salvage timber and Option 9
sales. s According to the rider's sponsors, these provisions
"were developed ... to limit the opportunity for frivolous lawsuits .... "9 Frivolous lawsuits, however, do not stop timber
4. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 828. These provisions, collectively known as the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program, were codified at 16 U.S.CA § 1611 (West
Supp. 1996). The cases summarized throughout this note generally refer to the
timber provisions as § 2001, pursuant to the session laws. Sections 1611 and 2001
are otherwise identicle and this note will refer only to the codified section.
The timber provisions were contained in a "rider" which was attached to the
Rescissions Act. "The term 'rider' refers to substantive legislation given a 'ride' on
an appropriations bill." Michael Axline, Salvage Logging: Point and Counterpoint:
Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENVTL. L. 613, 613 n.2 (1996).
Both the House and Senate have rules prohibiting the attachment of substantive
legislation to appropriations bills, but those rules are frequently waived. Id. (citing
Linda M. Bolduan, Comment, The Hatfield Riders: Eliminating the Role of Courts
in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329 (1990». See infra Part VA
In addition to its formal title, the timber provisions have also been called the "salvage logging rider," the "logging without laws rider," the "mother of all riders," the
"salvage rider," and the "1995 rider." These terms are interchangeable and most
appear at least once in this note.
5. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1611(b) (West Supp. 1996); see discussion infra Part HAL
6. § 1611(d). The President's Northwest Forest Plan is commonly referred to
as "Option 9," hence these sales are known as "Option 9 sales." See discussion
infra Part II.A2.
7. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 828. These previously authorized sales are known as
"section 318 sales" and are authorized pursuant to § 1611(k). See discussion infra
Part IIA3.
8. § 16H(e), (t).
9. Slade Gorton & Julie Kays, Salvage Logging: Point and Counterpoint: Legislative History of the Timber and Salvage Amendments Enacted in the l04th Congress: A Small Victory for Timber Communities in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVTL.
L. 641, 642 (1996) (emphasis added). Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) testified:
... As the process stands now, activists of every stripe
find it easy to be obstructionists using appeals, threats,
intimidations and false accusations in the media to slow
down or stop the agencies' salvage efforts. It is past time
for Congress to step in and clear a procedural path which
the agencies can use to make responsible salvage decisions and carry them out.
Id. at 461 n.114 (quoting 141 CONGo REC. S4868-01 (daily ed. March 30, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Larry Craig». However, as of June 20, 1995, lawsuits had delayed harvesting of only three percent of the timber volume offered by the United
States Forest Service. Trilby C. E. Dorn, Comment, Logging Without Laws: The
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sales.lO In reality, meritorious lawsuits, which challenge timber sales that are being conducted in violation of the law, do
stop timber sales. l l It is these meritorious lawsuits that have
been effectively halted by the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale
Program. 12
Section II of this note provides a brief background to the
Rescissions Act, outlines the Act's provisions and examines the
Ninth Circuit Court's decisions interpreting these provisions
prior to Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas. 13 Section III sets forth the facts and procedural history of ONRC II,
the most recent meritorious lawsuit to fall victim to the provisions of the Rescissions Act. Section IV examines the Ninth
Circuit Court's analysis and holding in ONRC II. Section V
argues that although the Ninth Circuit's decision in ONRC II
was correct under current standards, the result was fundamentally wrong. 14 Section V also examines the rules prohibiting
the attachment of substantive riders to appropriations bills,
the effect of such riders on public participation, and the multiple misrepresentations made by sponsors in the course of soliciting support for the salvage rider. Finally, section V proposes
a new standard to be applied by the courts when interpreting
the provisions of a substantive rider attached to an appropriations bill in violation of House and Senate rules. Section VI
concludes that the congressional rules prohibiting the attachment of riders to appropriations bills should not be waivable.
Alternatively, if those rules are waived, the courts must look
beyond the plain language of the subsequently enacted statute
when interpreting its provisions. Section VII then briefly sum-

1995 Salvage Logging Rider Radically Changes Policy and the Rule of Law in the
Forests, 9 TuL. ENVTL. L .. 447, 459 (1996) (citing Hearings on Timber Salvage
Before the House Salvage Timber and Forest Health Task Force, 104th Congo (Dec.
19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Furse, D. Or.».
10. Axline, supra note 4, at 614 n.5.
11. [d.
12. [d.

13. 92 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 1996) (ONRC II) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). The
cases discussed infra in Parts II.C.1-3 include Northwest Forest Resource Council
v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996); Inland Empire Public Lands Council v.
Glickman, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996); and Northwest Forest Resource Council v.
Pilchuck Audubon Society, 97 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1996).
14. Judge Hawkins also wrote, "It is not our role to determine the wisdom of
[the salvage rider], only its meaning." NFRC, 82 F.3d at 828.
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marizes three additional cases decided by the Ninth Circuit
subsequent to ONRC II. 15
II. BACKGROUND
Since the establishment of the forest reserve system in
1891, the national forests have been managed primarily to
ensure a high annual timber harvest. 16 In response to growing
public concern during the 1960s and 70s, Congress passed
several statutes which required comprehensive land planning
for multiple uses. 17 These statutes required that the forests
also be managed to protect animals, plants, soil, water and
biological diversity.1s
In 1995, representatives of the timber industry asked
Congress for relief from the increasing number of restrictive
environmental laws. 19 Although lawmakers were sympathetic,
they knew they were unlikely to succeed in granting such relief
by openly attacking the publicly accepted laws. 20 mtimately,
they hid their proposal in a popular initiative and then attached it to the first available "must-sign" legislation. 21 As a
result, the 1995 Rescissions Act was passed, complete with its
unrelated Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program provision,
and the Republican-led 104th Congress succeeded in suspending decades of environmental regulations. 22

15. The cases are Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 92 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, 93
F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1996); and Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v.
Glickman, 100 F.3d 1443 (9th Cir. 1996).
16. Dorn, supra note 9, at 449.
17. Id. These statutes included the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.CA
§§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA), 16 U.S.CA §§ 1600-1624 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); and the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370 (West 1994 & Supp.
1996).
18. Dorn, supra note 9, at 499.
19. Margaret Kriz, Timber!, NAT'L J., Feb. 3, 1996, at 252. Since 1984, the
timber industry has attempted to persuade Congress to exempt timber sales from
environmental laws at least twelve times. Dorn, supra note 9, at 461.
20. Kriz, supra note 19.
21. Id.
22. Dorn, supra note 9, at 499.
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A. THE 1995 RESCISSIONS ACT AND THE SALVAGE RIDER
The salvage rider was strategically attached to the 1995
Rescissions Act, an appropriations bill that provided emergency funding for anti-terrorist initiatives and disaster assistance,
including assistance in the recovery from the tragic bombing of
the federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 23 The
rider's sponsors knew that President Clinton opposed the rider
because he had previously vetoed a rescissions bill containing
similar language. 24 They correctly predicted, however, that
the President would be forced to sign the revised Rescissions
Act containing the emergency relief bill, despite its inclusion of
the rider. 25
The President signed the Act, giving life to the salvage
rider, on July 27, 1995.26 Although frequently modified by the
word "salvage," the rider actually authorized three distinct
categories of timber sales: 1) salvage timber sales, 2) Option 9
sales, and 3) Section 318 sales. 27

23. Axline, supra note 4, at 630; Pub. L. No. 104-19, 2001-2007, 109 Stat. 194,
240-47 (1995).
24. President Clinton initially vetoed the Rescissions Bill on June 7, 1995,
stating that suspending all of the country's environmental laws was not the appropriate way to log the national forests. Dorn, supra note 9, at 463.
25. Axline, supra note 4, at 630. Carl Pope, the executive director of the Sierra Club, stated "[t]he President evidently calculated that the risks of failing to
pass the RepUblicans' spending bill were greater than those of failing the forests."
Dorn, supra note 9, at 464 n.129 (quoting Carl Pope, Lawless Logging, SIERRA,
Nov. 1995, at 18).
26. See § 1611(a)(2). The rider designated an emergency period during which
salvage timber sales were to be conducted according to expedited procedures
§ 1611(b)(1). "The term 'emergency period' means the period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this section [July 27, 1995] and ending on September 30,
1997." § 1611(a)(2). However, a subsequent provision in the rider states, "[t]he
authority provided by subsections (b) and (d) shall expire on December 31, 1996.
The terms and conditions of this section shall continue in effect with respect to
salvage timber sale contracts offered under subsection (b) and timber sale contracts under subsection (d) until the completion of performance of the contracts."
§ 1611(j).
27. See § 1611(b), (d), (k).
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Salvage Timber Sales

Salvage timber sales are the first category of sales authorized by the rider.28 Section 1611(b) directs the Secretaries29
to prepare, advertise, offer and award salvage timber sales
contracts from lands within the National Forest System and
federal lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM).30 The rider defines the term 'salvage
timber sale' as "a timber sale for which an important reason
for entry includes the removal of disease- or insect-infested
trees, dead, damaged or down trees, or trees affected by fire or
imminently susceptible to fire or insect attack."31 However,
the term also includes the removal of associated trees, as long
as any such sale includes an identifiable salvage component. 32
This means that healthy trees may be sold under the provisions governing salvage sales, as long as the sale contains a
salvage component. 33
Section 1611(c) provides for expedited procedures for the
preparation of salvage timber sales. 34 Pursuant to this section, the Secretary concerned must prepare a document that
combines an environmental assessment under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and a biological evaluation
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).35 The preparation
28. § -1611(b).
29. The statute uses the tenn "the Secretary concerned." § 1611(a)(4) indicates
"the Secretary concernedn means "(Al the Secretary of Agriculture, with respect to
the lands within the National Forest System; and (B) the Secretary of the Interior, with respect to Federal lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land
ManagemenC § 1611(a)(4).
30. § 1611(b)(I).
31. § 1611(a)(3).
32. [d.
33. Axline, supra note 4, at 632. In fact, the Forest Service has reclassified a
number of healthy sales as salvage sales to take advantage of the statutory provisions of the Rescissions Act. [d. at 633 (citing Wilderness Soc'y, Reclassifying Timber Sales Under the Logging-Without-Laws Rider (1995) (summarizing sales that
have been reclassified from "health~ to "salvage" since the adoption of the salvage
logging rider».
34. § 1611(c).
35. § 1611(c)(I)(A). "[Tlhe Secretary concerned shall prepare a document that
combines an environmental assessment under section 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2» ... and a biological evaluation
under section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C.
1536(a)(2» ... and other applicable Federal law and implementing regulations."
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of the document is a mere formality, however, as the statute
states that the Secretaries retain sole discretion to consider the
environmental effects of the salvage timber sale and the effect,
if any, on threatened or endangered species. 36 In addition, the
Secretaries need only do so to the extent they consider appropriate and feasible. 37 Furthermore, the scope and content of
the documentation and information prepared, considered and
relied on is also subject to the sole discretion of the Secretaries. 3s
The rider, advanced under the guise of promoting forest
health, does not require the Secretaries to report to Congress
on how salvage sales are enhancing the health of the forests. 39 Instead, the Secretaries are required to report to Congress on the volume of salvage timber sold pursuant to the
rider.40 In addition, the rider declares that salvage timber
sales will not be precluded because the costs of the sale are
likely to exceed the revenues derived from it.'1 Moreover, the

[d. (emphasis added). The combined document is called an "EAlBE." But see Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service, 100 F.3d 1443
(9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the district court's finding that failure to prepare a
combined EAlBE was not a per se violation of the Rescissions Act).
In addition, § 1611(c)(1)(B) provides that in lieu of preparing a new document, the Secretary concerned may use a document prepared pursuant to NEPA
before the date of enactment of the Act, a biological evaluation written before such
date, or information collected for such a document or evaluation. § 1611(c)(1)(B).
36. § 1611(c)(1)(A).
37. [d.
38. § 1611(c)(1)(C).
39. Axline, supra note 4, at 624.
40. [d. at 624-25; § 1611(c)(2).
41. § 1611(c)(6). Ironically, the salvage rider "rode" on an appropriations bill
that purported to reduce the deficit, yet it contained a provision directing the
Forest Service and the BLM to sell salvage timber regardless of the cost to the
government. Axline, supra note 4, at 617. The Wilderness Society conservatively
estimated that the salvage logging rider would cost taxpayers $ 330 million. [d.
But see infra note 196 (suggesting the cost is probably much higher).
In addition to the fact that many of these sales are unprofitable, the costs
of federal timber are heavily subsidized. Axline, supra note 4, at 619. Current
federal subsidies come in several forms: 1) federal timber prices often do not reflect the administrative or road costs of selling and removing the timber; 2) export
restrictions allow domestic mills to bid for federal timber free from foreign competition; 3) salvage timber sales pursuant to the rider are exempt from the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984; 4) the price of federal timber does not reflect the
costs imposed on other national forest values; and 5) sale prices do not include
the costs borne by plant and animal species and their habitats. [d. at 619-22 and
accompanying notes.
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Secretary concerned may conduct salvage timber sales "notwithstanding any decision, restraining order, or injunction
issued by a United States court before the date of enactment of
[the ActJ.,,42
2.

Option 9 Sales

The salvage rider also authorizes a category of timber
sales known as Option 9 sales.43 These are sales made on the
federal lands described in Option 9, the land management plan
aIternative selected in the Record of Decision for Amendments
to Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning
Documents within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl. 44
The Secretaries are required to expeditiously prepare, offer
and award Option 9 sales and are authorized do so notwithstanding any other law, decision, restraining order or injunction issued by a United States court prior to the date of enactment of the Act. 45

a.

Administrative and Judicial Review of Salvage Timber and
Option" 9 Sales

Neither salvage timber sales nor Option 9 sales are subject
to administrative review. 46 In addition, the rider provides for
42. § 1611(c)(9).
43. § 1611(d).
44. [d.; see The Standards and Guidelines for Management of Habitat for LateSuccessional and Old-Growth Forest Related Species within the Range of the
Northern Spotted Owl adopted in the Record of Decision for Amendments to Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning Documents within the
Range of the Northern Spotted Owl (April 13, 1994). In 1993, President Clinton
convened the Northwest Forest Conference in Portland, Oregon to draft a compromise solution to the wars being fought over logging in the national forests that
were home to the endangered spotted owl. Dorn, supra note 9, at 461. AB a result
of that conference, the Forest Ecosystem Management ABsessment Team (FEMAT)
was created. [d. FEMAT's purpose was to identify and study a range of options
for the management of national forest lands in the range of the northern spotted
owl. [d. The final FEMAT report contained ten options. [d. President Clinton chose
Option 9, which reduced the amount of timber cut on federal lands and provide
greater protection for ancient forests than had previously been provided. Axline,
supra note 4, at 633.
45. § 1611(d).
46. § 1611(e). This is critical because the complex, technical nature of environ-
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only limited judicial review of these sales. 47 A challenge to a
proposed sale must be brought in the U.S. district court where
the affected lands are located, within 15 days after the date of
the initial advertisement of the challenged sale. 48 Courts may
not issue restraining orders, preliminary injunctions or injunctions pending appeal with respect to any decision to prepare,
advertise, offer award or operate a salvage timber or Option 9
sale. 49 However, the courts may enjoin permanently, order
modification of, or void an individual salvage timber sale if it
is determined, by a review of the record, that the decision to
prepare, advertise, offer, award or operate such sale was "arbitrary and capricious.,,5o This is an exacting standard given the
deference afforded to agency action. 51 In the case of the salvage rider, it is hard to imagine how a court could find a sale
arbitrary and capricious in relation to applicable law when
nearly all applicable law has been suspended. 52

mental law makes courts reluctant to interfere with agency expertise unless there
is a clear abuse of power. Paul Maynard Kakuske, Comment, Clear· Cutting Public
Participation in Environmental Law: The Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program,
29 LoY. LA L. REv. 1859, 1872 (1996) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984». Given the deference
found at the judicial level, the best opportunity to participate in or challenge a
proposed timber sale usually occurs at the administrative level. [d. at 1872. The
rider, however, prohibits administrative review of salvage timber and Option 9
sales and thus forces challengers into the judicial arena where the only standard
of review available is "arbitrary and capricious." § 1611(e), (0(4). Unfortunately, it
is unlikely that challengers will succeed under arbitrary and capricious review because a court must find the decision arbitrary and capricious in relation to an existing legal standard. Dorn, supra note 9, at 471. Section 1611(i) arguably removes
all existing legal standards, leaving a court with nothing against which to measure
the lawfulness of the agency action. [d. at 472; see § 1611(i).
47. § 1611(0(1}-(7).
48. § 1611(0(1).
49. § 1611(0(3). In effect, this provision means that by the time a judge issues
a final order determining the legality of a sale, the trees may already be logged.
Dorn, .supra note 9, at 468.
50. § 1611(0(4).
51. See supra note 46.
52. See § 1611(i).
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The Effect of Other Laws on Salvage Timber and Option 9
Sales

The most controversial prOVISIOn contained in the Act is
§ 1611(i) entitled "[e]ffect on other laws[.ra Section 1611(i)
states "[t]he documents and procedures required by this section
for the preparation, advertisement, offering, awarding and
operation of any [salvage timber and Option 9 sale] shall be
deemed to satisfy the requirements of the following applicable
federal laws (and regulations implementing such laws):" 1) the
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of
1974 (FRRRPA);54 2) the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA);55 3) the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA);56 4) the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA);57 5) the National Forest Management Act of 1976
(NFMA);58 6) the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960
53. § 1611(i). This section has also been called the "sufficiency clause." Dorn,
supra note 9, at 467.
54. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1687 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
55. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1784 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370d (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). In the context of
forest management, NEPA requires that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
be prepared for timber sales in excess of one million board feet when such sales
would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. § 4332(C); 40
C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1996); see The Found. for Global Sustainability Inc.'s Forest Protection and Biodiversity Project v. McConnell, No. 2:93CV69, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11207, at *4 (W.O. N.C. June 2, 1993) (stating "salvage which removes
1,000,000 board feet or less of merchantable wood products and which requires one
mile or less of low standard road construction has no significant impact on the
human environment, and therefore may be categorically excluded from those projects requiring an EA or an EIS"). An EIS must also discuss possible impacts and
assess viable alternatives. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1870. In addition,
[i]n the context of public participation, NEPA plays two
critical roles. First, because an EIS contains a legal sufficiency requirement, it provides the public with an opportunity to challenge either the absence or inadequacy of
the EIS in court. . . . Second, and most importantly,
NEPA provides for extensive public involvement in the
preparation, scope and review of the EIS.
[d. (citations omitted).
NEPA's public involvement and information disclosure requirements allow
the public to apply political pressure to poorly conceived timber sales. [d. at 1871.
This type of pressure has proven to be very successful and, as a result, has motivated state public disclosure laws such as California's Proposition 65. [d.
57. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
58. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 472a-545a (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). NFMA's timber har-
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(MUSy);59 7) any compact, executive agreement, convention,
treaty, and international agreement, and implementing legislation; and 8) all other applicable federal environmental and
natural resource laws. 60
3.

Section 318 Sales

The third and final category of timber sales authorized by
the salvage logging rider involves sales offered or awarded
before the rider's date of enactment in any unit of the National
Forest System or district of the BLM subject to section 318 of
Public Law 101-121. 61 "Notwithstanding any other provision
vest provisions reduce the area from which the Forest Service may legally authorize timber sales. Dorn, supra note 9, at 457. NFMA forbids harvests on lands
1) designated as "marginal," 2) where logging would destroy biological diversity,
3) where watersheds cannot be protected, and 4) where the costs of the sale exceed revenues. [d. In addition, the amount harvested cannot exceed the amount
which can be removed "annually in perpetuity on a sustained-yield basis." [d. at
457-58. Finally, although the Act does not forbid clearcuts, it restricts their size
and provides that they must be "the optimum method . . . to meet the objectives
and requirements of the relevant land management plan." [d. at 458.
59. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
60. § 1611(i) (emphasis added).
61. § 1611(k)(1). To date, this provision of the rider has received the most
attention in court. Axline, supra note 4, at 634. This can be attributed, in part, to
the fact that much of the section 318 timber is located in habitat which is critically important to threatened or endangered species. [d. at 614 n. 11. Prior to 1990,
court orders prohibited logging in these areas, due to the presence of the northern
spotted owl. [d. Then, in 1990, a rider attached to an appropriations bill removed
the courts' jurisdiction. [d.; see Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 318(0(1), 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1989).
That rider, formally entitled the Northwest Timber Compromise of 1989, is commonly referred to as "section 318." Dorn, supra note 9, at 472 n.189.
Section 318 mandated "aggregate timber sale levels" for timber harvests cut
from National Forest Service and BLM lands in Oregon and Washington during
fiscal years 1989 and 1990. § 318. The aggregate timber sale level for the Forest
Service waR seven billion seven hundred million board feet of net merchantable
timber, of which five billion eight hundred million was to come from the thirteen
national forests in Oregon and Washington known to contain northern spotted
owls. § 318(a)(1). From its administrative districts in Western Oregon, the BLM
was required to meet an aggregate timber sale level of one billion nine hundred
million board feet. § 318(a)(2). A board foot is an industry unit of measure equal
to the cubic contents of a piece of lumber 12" x 12" x 1". WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 244 (1993).
Section 318 reduced the amount of timber that the Forest Service and the
BLM had to sell from ten billion board feet to 9.6 billion board feet of net merchantable timber. Bolduan, supra note 4, at 383. The rider provided for one level
of administrative review, as well as expedited judicial review. [d. at 384. Section
318 prohibited restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, but provided for per-
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of law," these sales must be awarded "with no change in originally advertised terms, volumes, and bid prices.,,62 Although
the rider states that section 318 sales will not be released if
any threatened or endangered bird species is known to be
nesting within the acreage that is the subject of the sale unit,
it also provides that, should this be the case, the Secretaries
must provide the purchaser with an equal volume of timber, of
like kind and value, and subject to the terms of the original
contract. 63
B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON THE RESCISSIONS ACT

Upon signing the Rescissions Act into law, President
Clinton stated:
To be sure, I do not support every provision of
this bill. For instance, I still do not believe that
this bill should contain any of the provisions
relating to timber. But, the final bill does con-

tain changes in the language that preserve our
ability to implement the current forest plans
and their standards, and protect other resources
such as clean water and fisheries. . .. I have
directed the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and other Federal
agencies to carry out timber salvage activities
consistent with our forest plans and existing
environmentallaws. 64
manent injunctions if, after a trial on the merits, a court detennined the sale was
arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with the law. [d.
Implementation of Section 318 was delayed by several lawsuits. Northwest
Forest Resource Council, 82 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). The constitutionality of
section 318 was challenged and upheld in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503
U.S. 429 (1992). [d. at 829 n.3. Allegations of noncompliance with the terms of
section 318 were litigated in Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson, Civ. Nos. 89160, 89-99 (W.D. Wash. March 7, 1991). [d. In addition there were various challenges to section 318 sales based on the Endangered Species Act. [d. Eventually,
section 318 resulted in a number of timber sales that were offered but then withdrawn when it was discovered that an additional threatened species, the marbled
murrelet, also relied on the habitat that would be destroyed by the sales. Axline,
supra note 4, at 614 n.11.
62. § 1611(k)(1).
63. § 1611(k)(2),(3).
64. Statements by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 1944, 31
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The directive referred to in the President's statement resulted in an interagency Memorandum of Agreement in which
the Secretaries and the Administrator agreed to "comply with
previously existing environmental laws except where expressly
prohibited by [the Rescissions Act.r5 This Memorandum of
Agreement only applied to salvage sales however, and it was
not enforceable at law. 66
The deluge of lawsuits began almost immediately after the
President signed the Act into law. 67 The first action was
brought by the timber industry, which sought a clarification of
the scope of sales affected by the phrase "subject to section
318," found in § 1611(k)(1) of the rider. 68 The district court's
decision in that case, and the Ninth Circuit's subsequent denial of an emergency motion for an injunction pending the appeal of that decision, prompted the following statement from
the President: "My administration's agreement with Congress
on this issue was significantly different from the interpretation
upheld this week by the courts .... My administration will actively pursue a legislative remedy to correct this extreme result.,,69 Subsequently, on February 24, 1996, the President
called for a repeal of the salvage logging rider.70
Most recently, Vice President Gore summarized the
Administration's position by stating that signing the salvage
logging rider
was, indeed, our biggest mistake and it never

WEEKLY COMPo PREs. Doc. 1377 (Aug. 7, 1995). See infra note 224.
65. See infra note 225.
66. In the summer of 1996, an objective review of compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement was conducted by representatives of the Forest Service, the
Bureau of Land Management, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and
Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Office of Management and Budget. For the results of this review, see Department of Agriculture,
Administration Releases Review of Activities Conducted Under Salvage Rider, Release No. 0629.96 (Dec. 6, 1996) (available through the Federal Document Clearing
House, Inc.)
67. See infra Parts II.C., VII.
68. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, No. 95-6244-HO, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13300 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 1995).
69. Axline, supra note 4, at 635-637.
70. James Gerstenzang, Clinton Backs Repeal of Logging Provision, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1996, at A16.
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would have happened except for a miscalculation
on our part about the magnitude of what was
wrong with the provision. We were genuinely
surprised. .. by the court decision[s] which
vastly expanded the scope of something we
thought could be muted by administrative action. We knew it was not good policy. But it was
[an] example[] of one thing imbedded in a huge,
overall measure that had to pass. 71
C.

NINTH CIRCmT DECISIONS TO DATE INTERPRETING THE
RESCISSIONS ACT

To date, most of the prOVISIOns of the rider have been
litigated. 72 In its decisions, the Ninth Circuit has ruled almost
exclusively in favor of the timber industry, upholding broad
Forest Service discretion and refusing to limit the rider's
scope. 73
1.

Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman

Section 318 sales were the subject of the first Ninth Circuit decision interpreting the provisions of the Rescissions Act.
In Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman,74 the court
was asked to define the categories of timber sales the Secretaries were required to release pursuant to § 1611(k)(1).75 The

71. John H. Cushman, Jr. & Timothy Egan, Battles on Conservation Are
Reaping Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1996, at AI.
72. See infra Parts II.C., VII.
73. Dorn, supra note 9, at 482.
74. 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (NFRC).
75. Id. at 828. § 1611(k)(1) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, within 45
days after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 27,
1995], the Secretary concerned shall act to award, release,
and permit to be completed in fiscal years 1995 and 1996,
with no change in originally advertised terms, volumes,
and bid prices, all timber sale contracts offered or awarded before that date in any unit of the National Forest
System or district of the Bureau of Land Management
subject to section 318 of Public Law 101-121 (l03 Stat.
745)[.]
§ 1611(k)(l) (emphasis added).
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Northwest Forest Resource Council (NFRC)76 argued that the
phrase "subject to section 318," contained in § 1611(k)(1), described only section 318's geographical boundaries, but did not
include its chronological limits. 77 According to NFRC's interpretation, § 1611(k)(1) required the Secretaries to release not
only the sales that had occurred in fiscal years 1989 and 1990,
but all subsequent sales occurring through the enactment of
the Rescissions Act in July, 1995. 78 In contrast, the Secretaries argued that the reference to section 318 imposed both geographical and temporal limits on the scope of § 1611(k)(1),
thus limiting the releases to those sales which occurred in
fiscal years 1989 and 1990. 79
Based on the structure of § 1611(k)(1), the plain and ordinary meaning of the words it contained and severallong-standing principles of statutory interpretation, the court concluded
that the language of § 1611(k)(1) was clear and that the phrase
"subject to section 318" defined only the geographical reach of
the statute. 80 The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the district
court's order adopting NFRC's interpretation of § 1611(k)(1)
and its permanent injunction directing the Secretaries to release all timber sale contracts offered or awarded between
October 1, 1990 and July 27, 1995.81
A devastating blow to environmentalists, the case did not
end with the clarification of the scope of section 318 sales.
NFRC was in fact a consolidation of two cases arising out of

76. NFRC is a timber industry trade association. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 828.
77. [d. at 829. Section 318's geographical boundaries included "the national
forests of Oregon and Washington ... [and the BLM] administrative districts in
western Oregon." § 318(a)(1), (2). The section specifically exempted certain portions
of those areas containing northern spotted owls. § 318(b)(3), (5). Section 318 was
limited chronologically to "fiscal years 1989 and 1990." § 318(a)(1), (2).
78. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 829-830. Amazingly, the timber industry originally
sought the release of every timber sale ever offered, in the states of Oregon and
Washington, from the creation of the national forest system in 1891 until the
enactment of the Act in 1995. See Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman,
No. 95-6244, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13300 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 1995).
79. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 831. Under the Secretaries' interpretation, they were required to release an estimated 410 million board feet of net merchantable timber.
[d. at 828. NFRC's interpretation would require the release of an additional 246
million board feet, or a total of 656 million board feet. [d.
80. [d. at 834.
81. [d. at 839.
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the same set of events. S2 In the second appeal, Oregon Natural Resources Council and several other environmental organizations (collectively ONRC) challenged the district court's refusal to allow their intervention in NFRC's lawsuit against the
Secretaries. 53 NFRC opposed ONRC's motion to intervene arguing that ONRC's interests in the enforcement of environmental laws were irrelevant because § 1611(k)(1) nullified
those laws. 84 The Ninth Circuit held that ONRC had not demonstrated a "significantly protectable interest" in the lawsuit to
merit intervention because § 1611(k)(1), with its phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law," explicitly preempted
the environmental laws ONRC sought to protect. 85
2.

Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman

Almost immediately after issuing its decision in NFRC, the
Ninth Circuit confirmed precisely how deferential arbitrary
and capricious review could be in a case involving salvage
timber sales. 86 In Inland Empire, the Inland Empire Public
Lands Council (the Council) filed an action seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the Secretary from proceeding with
salvage timber sales of approximately 36 million board feet in
the Kootenai National Forest in northwest Montana. 87 The
Forest Service was conducting these sales pursuant to the
provisions contained in the Rescissions Act and had prepared
Biological Assessments (BAs) as required by that Act. 88 The
BAs concluded that the sales were not likely to adversely affect
the CabineVYaak Ecosystem grizzly bear, a threatened species
under the ESA. 89 The Council argued that the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Forest Service's

82. [d. at 828.
83. [d.
84. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 830 n.5. NFRC opposed ONRC's motion to intervene for·

two additional reasons: NFRC claimed that (1) ONRC's interests would not be
impaired by the lawsuit; and (2) ONRC's interests would be adequately represented by the Secretaries. [d.
85. [d. at 837. In effect, this decision mandates the same results for section
318 sales as the sufficiency clause does for salvage timber and Option 9 sales.
86. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir.
1996) (Inland Empire).
87. [d. at 700.
88. [d. See § 16U(c)(1)(A).
89. [d.
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new 'core area strategy' would inadequately protect the grizzly
bear population. 90 In upholding the agency's decision, the
Ninth Circuit unequivocally stated that, under the Rescissions
Act, "[t]he Forest Service did not need to consider the effect on
the grizzly bear. . . . [It] had discretion to disregard entirely
the effect on the grizzly bear.',gl
The Council also argued that 1) the Forest Service had
failed to rationalize its change in bear protection policy, and
2) the core area strategy did not incorporate all of the specific
recommendations of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee
Taskforce Report, upon which the Forest Service relied. 92 The
Ninth Circuit dismissed both of those arguments. First, the
court found that the Forest Service's explanation, that recent
fires had triggered the new policy, was sufficient.93 Second,
the court determined that § 1611(c)(1) gave the Secretary the
sole discretion over the information considered to reach a decision, and the sole discretion to determine whether that decision
complied with existing applicable forest management plans
and guidelines. 94
Alternatively, the Council argued that the "sole discretion"
language contained in § 1611(c)(1) required the Secretary of
Agriculture to personally authorize all salvage timber sales. 95
Disagreeing, the Ninth Circuit noted that Secretary Glickman
had followed the delegation procedures which the Secretary of
90. Id. at 701. Specifically, the core area strategy "1) appl[iedl the road density limitation only to each Bear Management Unit, rather than to each smaller
Bear Analysis Area, 2) allow[edl exceptions to the forty-acre opening size and 600foot movement corridor restrictions, and 3) allow[edl exceptions to the seventypercent habitat effectiveness standard." Id.
91. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 701 (emphasis added). The Court also reiterated
that the Rescissions Act provided for extremely limited judicial review. Id. Review
of salvage timber sales is thus limited, the court stated, in that "(1) review is
based on the administrative record only; (2) the standard of review is arbitrary
and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with applicable law; and (3) the sale
is not subject to any federal environmental or natural resources laws." [d. (quoting
Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 906 F. Supp. 410, 412
(E.D. Ky. 1995».
92. [d. at 702.
93. Id. In August 1994, a lightning storm ignited over 200 flres in the
Kootenai National Forest. [d. at 700. Fifty-five thousand acres were burned. [d.
94. Id. at 702.
95. Id. In this case, the sales had been authorized by the Chief of the United
States Forest Service, Jack Ward Thomas.
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Agriculture traditionally used, and that requiring the Secretary to personally authorize every salvage timber sale would
contradict the stated purpose of the Rescissions Act, which was
to expedite such sales. 96
Finally, the Council argued that the district court improperly struck several extra-record materials. 97 In response, the
Ninth Circuit stressed that § 1611(f)(4) of the Rescissions Act
limited judicial review "to a review of the record."98 Therefore,
unless one of the recognized exceptions was present, extrarecord materials would not be considered. 99
3.

Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuck Audubon
Society

Finding their attacks on individual provisions of the rider
to be ineffective, environmentalists shifted their focus to the
constitutionality of the statute as a whole. The question of
whether the provisions of the rider were constitutional was
addressed in Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuck
Audubon Society.lOo In Pilchuck, there were in fact five issues
before the court. 101 The district court had held that 1) the
provisions of the rider were constitutional, 2) the rider applied
to timber sales enjoined or canceled prior to its passage,
3) timber sales offered in violation of their authorizing statutes
were within the scope of § 1611(k)(1),102 4) the rider required

96. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 702.
97. Id. Specifically, "the district court struck two expert declarations regarding
grizzly bear survival, four Forest Service and FWS documents and two papers on
grizzly bear management, upon which the Forest Service did not rely, and several
FWS documents upon which FWS relied in reaching its concurrence." Id.
98. Id. The court also stated that the Ninth Circuit would only consider extrarecord materials when (1) they were necessary to determine whether the agency
has considered all relevant factors and had explained its decision, (2) the agency
had relied on documents not in the record, (3) supplementing the record was necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter, or (4) plaintiffs made
a showing of agency bad faith. Id. at 703-04.
99. Id.
100. 97 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1996) (Pilchuck).
101. Id. at 1162.
102. The section directs:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, within 45
days after the date of enactment of this act [July 27,
19951, the Secretary concerned shall act to award, release,
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the sales to be reoffered to all previous bidders, and 5) the
Secretaries use of PSG protocoP03 to determine when marbled
murrelets were "known to be nesting" violated the rider's provisions. 104
First, appellants argued that the rider was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers doctrine by
permitting Congress to resurrect sales that had been enjoined
by federal courtS. 105 The Ninth Circuit quickly disposed of
this argument stating that the rider would only violate the
separation of powers doctrine if it directed certain findings in
pending litigation without changing any underlying law. lOS
The Ninth Circuit found that the lower court had correctly
applied the test stated in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,
and therefore the rider was constitutional. 107
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's ruling

and pennit to be completed in fiscal years 1995 and 1996,
with no change in originally advertised terms, volumes,
and bid prices, all timber sale contracts offered or awarded before that date in any unit of the National Forest
System or district of the Bureau of Land Management
subject to section 318 of Public Law 101-121 (103 Stat.
745) [not classified to the Code1- ..."
§ 1611(k}(1} (emphasis added).
103. The PSG Protocol is the scientifically accepted method of detennining the
"presence or probable absence" of marbled murre lets in a particular forest stand.
Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1167 (citing Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F.
Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995)}. Listed as a threatened species since 1992, the marbled murrelet is prone to elusive behavior which makes it extremely difficult to
detennine when it is nesting based purely on physical evidence. [d. at 1169. Using
the Protocol, a stand of trees is detennined to be a nesting stand based on a statistical analysis involving such evidence as: "(1) detection of an active nest or recent nest by a fecal ring or eggshell fragments; (2) . . . birds flying in, out or
through the canopy; or (3) birds circling directly over or under the canopy." [d.
104. [d. at 1164. According to § 1611(k}(2}, "[nlo sale unit shall be released or
completed under this subsection if any threatened or endangered bird species is
known to be nesting within the acreage that is the subject of the sale unit."
§ 1611(k}(2} (emphasis added). Other than the "known to be nesting" language,
Congress provided no guidance for detennining which timber sales were exempt
from § 1611(k}(2} and compensated for under § 1611(k}(3}. Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at
1168.
105. Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1165.
106. [d.
107. [d. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (holding
that section 318 "compelled changes in the law, not results under old law," thus it
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine).
.
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that the rider applied to all previously enjoined or canceled
timber sales, but reversed the determination that sales offered
in violation of their authorizing statutes were also within the
scope of the rider. lOS The court stated that, while it could find
nothing in § 1611(k)(1) that would make a valid sale out of a
sale which was not valid under its authorizing statute, the
definition of the word "offered" combined with the plain language of the rider could not exclude the release of validly offered sales that were subsequently enjoined or canceled. I09
Next, the Ninth Circuit examined the Secretaries argument that § 1611(k)(1) did not require them to seek out unsuccessful bidders in cases where the original high bidders were
unwilling, unable, or unqualified to take advantage of the
renewed offer. l1O The court noted that both the Forest Service
and the BLM had statutes and regulations which gave them
the discretion to refuse to award a sale where the high bidder
was ineligible. 111 The court then stated its unwillingness to
find an implied repeal of those statutes and regulations, particularly when that repeal would be based on an appropriations
act, and reversed the determination of the lower court. 112
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also reversed the lower court's
determination that the Secretaries' use of the PSG protocol
violated .the provisions of the rider.113 The Secretaries argued
that the PSG protocol was consistent with § 1611(k)(1)'s requirements. ll4 The timber industry insisted, however, that a
"known to be nesting" determination could only be based on
physical evidence. 115 The district court rejected both parties'
arguments and formulated its own interpretation of "known to
be nesting."l1s The Ninth Circuit began by noting that the
rider itself was ambiguous. 117 In addition, the legislative his-

108. Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1164.
109. [d. at 1166.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

[d.
[d.
[d.
Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1170.
[d. at 1168. See supra note 102-03.
Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1168.

116. [d.
117. [d.
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tory was not helpful because the rider had not been reviewed
by a committee. U8 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had erred by not deferring to the Secretaries' interpretation, that interpretation being reasonable based on the
language of the rider and the time frame for implementation.u9
The decisions in NFRC, Inland Empire and Pilchuck set
the stage for the sweeping interpretation of § 1611(i) and its
effect on Option 9 sales that followed in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas. 120 For the fourth time, the decision was a victory for the timber industry.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In ONRC II, two environmental organizations, the Oregon
Natural Resources Council and Umpqua Watersheds, Inc.
(collectively ONRC), tried to block four timber sales by Jack
Ward Thomas, Chief of the United States Forest Service. 121
The four challenged sales were the Roughneck, Watchdog,
Pinestrip, and Snog sales. 122 The Ninth Circuit only considered ONRC's claims against the latter two sales. 123 The
Pinestrip and Snog sales were located in the Upper North
Umpqua River Basin in southwestern Oregon, over 30 miles of
118. [d. at 1167.
119. [d. at 1168-1170.
120. 92 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 1996) (ONRC Il) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
121. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 794 (9thCir.
1996) (ONRC Il) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). In Inland Empire Public Lands Coun·
cil v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court upheld Chief Thomas'
authority to sell timber as the subdelegatee of the Secretary of Agriculture. [d. at
794 n.l. See supra Part II.C.2.
122. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, No. 95-6272-HO 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19567, at *2 (D. Or. filed Dec. 5, 1995) (ONRC). The Roughneck and
Watchdog sales were awarded in 1994, before the enactment of the Rescissions
Act. [d. The Pinestrip and Snog sales were advertised and offered after the date
of enactment. [d. ONRC's challenge to the Roughneck and Watchdog sales was
effectively resolved against them by the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in North·
west Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
the phrase "subject to section 318" in § 1611(k)(1) of the 1995 Rescissions Act in·
clud~d only section 318's geographical limits, not its chronological limits, thereby
authorizing timber sales offered or awarded after fiscal years 1989 and 1990
through the enactment of the Rescissions Act). ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794. See suo
pra Part I1.C.l.
123. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794.
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which had been designated as wild and scenic river. 124 In addition, these sales also involved timber growing on land subject
to President Clinton's Northwest Forest Plan, commonly referred to as Option 9. 125
ONRC argued that the Pinestrip and Snog sales would
degrade aquatic resources and reduce viable populations of
native aquatic and amphibious species in violation of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).126 In addition, ONRC
alleged that the sales did not comply with Option 9, which was
binding on the Forest Service under NFMA.127 Finally, ONRC
maintained that the sales were "arbitrary and capricious" under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) § 706(2)(A) for three
reasons. 12S First, the Forest Service did not obtain informa124. [d. Congress has declared "that certain selected rivers of the Nation which,
with their immediate environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall
be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their immediate environments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (West 1985) (emphasis added). See 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1274(a)(95) (West Supp. 1996) (designating "[t]he 33.8-mile segment from the
Soda Springs Powerhouse to Rock Creek in the following classes: (A) [t]he 25.4mile segment from the Soda Springs Powerhouse to the Umpqua National Forest
boundary as a recreational river; to be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture; and (B) the 8.4-mile segment from the Umpqua National Forest boundary to
its confluence with Rock Creek as a recreational river; to be administered by the
Secretary of the Interior.").
125. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794. See supra note 44.
126. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794. See National Forest Management Act, 16
U.S.C.A. § 1604(g)(3) (West 1985); 36 C.F.R. § 219 et seq. (1996). Section 1604 (g)
directs the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations that set out the
process for the development and revision of land management plans, guidelines
and standards prescribed by the Act. § 1604(g). "The regulations shall include ...
(3) specifying guidelines for land management plans developed to achieve the goals
of the Program which . . . (B) provide for the diversity of plant and animal communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order
to meet overall multiple-use objectives, ... (C) insure research on and . . . evaluation of the effects of each management system to the end that it will not produce
substantial and permanent impairment of the productivity of the land[.l"
§ 1604(g)(3)(B), (C).
127. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794-95. Specifically, ONRC alleged a violation of 16
U.S.C.A. § 1604(i) and 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e). Section 1604(i) states, in part,
"[r]esource plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and
occupancy of National Forest System lands shall be consistent with the land ~an
agement plans." § 1604(i).
128. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 795. Section 706 is entitled the "scope of review." 5
U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 1996). It states "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or ap-
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tion necessary to ensure a) that the sales would not affect the
maintenance of viable populations of aquatic and amphibious
species, and b) that the sales would not seriously, adversely
affect the watershed. 129 Second, the Forest Service found that
the sales would not have a significant environmental impact
despite evidence to the contrary by its own experts. 130 Finally, the Forest Service failed to complete mitigation measures it
committed to in connection with the sales. 131
The district court dismissed ONRC's case based on the
provisions of the salvage rider contained in the 1995 Rescissions Act and the APA.132 ONRC appealed this decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 133 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision concluding that Option 9 sales,
pursuant to the rider, were not subject to federal environmental and resource law challenges and that there could be no
"arbitrary and capricious" review under APA § 706(2)(A) independent of another statute. 134
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In deciding whether review of Option 9 timber sales was
available under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Ninth
Circuit began by looking at the section of the rider entitled
"Effect on other laws.,,135 The court noted that the effect of
the plain language of § 1611(i) was to render sufficient, under
the environmental laws, any documents and procedures the

plicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law[.]" § 706(2)(A).
129. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 795 (citing CR 23 'II 17.-d). ONRC did not allege that
any statute other than the APA required the Forest Service to obtain this information.ld.
130. Id. (citing Opening Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 25-26).
131. Id. (citing Opening Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 26-27).
132. Id.; ONRC, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19567.
133. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 795.
134. Id. at 796, 797 n.10. In ONRC II, Judge Reinhardt wrote a concurring
opinion declining to decide whether there can ever be a violation of the APA in
the absence of an independent statute that supports the violation. ONRC II, 92
F.3d at 799.
135. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir.
1996) (ONRC II) (Reinhardt, J., concurring); § 1611(i); see supra Part II.A.2.b.
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agency elected to use for an Option 9 sale. 136 As a result,
ONRC's challenges to the sales based on NFMA and its implementing regulations failed. 137 The court rejected ONRC's argument that legal sufficiency should only be extended to documents and procedures used to "prepare, offer and award" sales,
but not to those underlying an agency's decision to "operate" a
sale/3S noting that the language of § 1611(i) explicitlyextended legal sufficiency to documents and procedures underlying an
agency's decision to operate a sale. 139 Furthermore, "allowing
environmentally-based challenges to the operation of Option 9
sales would frustrate one of the rider's primary purposes: to
enable the logging of timber on Option 9 land."l40
The court then considered "the overriding thrust" of
ONRC's case. 141 ONRC argued that the Pinestrip and Snog
sales were "arbitrary and capricious" under APA § 706(2)(A),
even assuming no other law applied. 142 In affirming the
district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit looked not to
§ 706(2)(A), but to § 701(a)(2).143 The latter section forbids
judicial review of agency action "to the extent that . . . agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law."l44 The court
explained that "the APA is merely a vehicle for carrying substantive challenges to court. "145 As ONRC could not point to
any independent, substantive body of law that confined the
Forest Service's discretion to go forward with the sales, their
decision to sell the timber was committed to agency discretion
under § 701(a)(2) and therefore, not reviewable. l46

136. ONRe II, 92 F.3d at 795.
137. Id. at 796.
138. Id. at 795-96 n.7. The premise was that ONRC was challenging the "operation" of the sales, and not the administrative decision to offer and award the
sales. ONRe, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19567, at *6.
139. "The documents and procedures required by this section for the preparation, advertisement, offering, awarding, and operation of any timber sale under
subsection (d) shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the following. . . ."
§ 1611(i) (enphasis added).
140. ONRe II, 92 F.3d at 795-796 n.7.
141. Id. at 796.
142. Id. For the language of § 706(2)(A), see supra note 128.
143. ONRe II, 92 F.3d at 796.
144. Id. (quoting § 701(a)(2».
145. Id.
146. Id.
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ONRC then argued that the court's analysis rendered
meaningless § 1611(0 of the rider to the extent that it provided
for judicial review. 147 Disagreeing, the court stated that
ONRC would only be correct if the rider insulated Option 9
sales from any judicial scrutiny.l4S Since § 1611(i) only extended legal sufficiency to documents and procedures for Option 9 sales under federal environmental and natural resource
laws, it did not foreclose challenges based on other laws. 149
The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the district court that the
best interpretation of § 1611(d),s requirement to expedite the
preparation, offer and award of Option 9 sales
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law" required the
disregard of environmental laws only, not all laws otherwise
applicable to Option 9 sales. 150 The court pointed out that
language located elsewhere in the statute also suggested that
this was Congress' intent. 151
ONRC also argued that § 1611(0(4) supported the idea
that review under the APA was consistent with. the rider's
suspension of federal environmental and natural resource laws
because it allowed a court to prevent a salvage timber sale if it
determined that "the decision to prepare, offer, award or operate the sale was arbitrary and capricious[.],,152 In response,
the Ninth Circuit reiterated that § 706(2)(A) only provided the
standard to be applied on review, but before a party could

147. [d. Section 1611(0(1) states that salvage timber and Option 9 sales are
subject to judicial review only in a United States district court for the district in
which the affected Federal lands are located, and only if such a challenge is filed
within 15 days after the date of initial advertisement of the challenged sale. §
1611(0(1).
148. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 796.
149. [d. The defendant intervenors suggested that "challenges would still be
available based on federal contracting laws, such as ... a claim alleging a failure
to include required labor or non-discrimination provisions in a contract, a claim for
violations of log export restrictions, small business set-aside provisions . . . and
other non-environmental laws." [d. (citing Opposition Br. of Defendant-Intervenor
Appellees at 15.)
150. [d. Citing several examples, the Court stated that it had repeatedly found
that the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law" is not always
construed literally. [d. It should be noted, however, that this interpretation renders the sufficiency clause in 1611(i), specifically 1611(i)(8), duplicative, contradicting a long standing principle of statutory interpretation: that sections of a statute
should be read to give effect, if possible, to every clause.
151. [d. at 797; see § 1611(0(4).
152. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 797. See § 1611(0(4).
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obtain any such review, it would first have to clear the § 701(a)
hurdle. 153
Finally, ONRC contended that decisions to sell Option 9
timber were not committed to agency discretion because they
were "typically well-suited to judicial review" and they "traditionally ha[d] been reviewable."lM Although the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that those were relevant considerations in a
§ 701(a)(2) analysis/55 the court restated its position that review under § 701(a)(2) was dependent upon whether there was
a law to apply.156 In this case, there simply was no underlying law.
V.

CRITIQUE

It would be difficult to claim that any of the Ninth Circuit
Court's decisions interpreting the rider were incorrect. The
plain language of the statute does indeed support most of those
decisions. But there is a more fundamental level upon which
the wisdom of those decisions should be measured. The members of Congress represent the people of the United States.
Yet, the passage of the salvage rider ran contrary to the express will of those people. This is evidenced by the more than
sixty thousand communications, including letters, faxes, e-mail
messages and phone calls, the White House received asking
President Clinton to veto the bill based on its inclusion of the
salvage logging· rider.157 The President also received almost
1000 pieces of wood carrying similar messages. 15S On the day
he signed the Rescissions Act into law, the President received
an additional 350,000 petitions from Americans demanding
that U.S. forests, wilderness and other public lands be protect-

153. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 797 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828
(1985)).
154. Id. at 798 (citing Opening Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22).
155. Id. (citing Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1994».
156. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971».
157. Environmental Groups Blast President Clinton for Signing Timber Rider;
Hold '21 Chainsaw Salute' in Front of the White House, U.S. NEWSWIRE, July 28,
1995 [hereinafter Environmental Groups Blast Clinton].
158. Id.
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ed. IS9 Subsequently, a recent poll reported that 74 percent of
Americans are opposed to the salvage rider. 160 The executive
director of the American Ocean Campaign aptly stated, "[i]t is
disturbing that the voices of thousands of Americans . . . will
be muted by the sickening roar of chainsaws in our national
forests."161 Clearly, Congress failed to act in accordance with
the will of the people when it passed the Rescissions Act.
A.

THE PROHIBITION ON RIDERS

Lack of public support for the salvage rider aside, there
are several other reasons why it should be invalidated. First
and foremost, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have rules prohibiting the attachment of substantive provisions to spending bills. 162 The House Rules prohibit any
amendment to a general appropriation if it changes existing
law. l63 Similarly, the Senate Rules prohibit the Committee on
Appropriations from reporting an appropriations bill that contains amendments which propose new or general legislation. l64 Attaching the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program to the 1995 Rescissions Act clearly violated the rules of
both Houses. lss Nonetheless, the rider's sponsors were able to
use their positions to influence other members of Congress to
waive the House rules prohibiting such riders.l66 The Senate
159. [d.
160. Dorn, supra note 9, at 481 (citing Brian Broderick, Environmentalists Release Poll Finding Widespread Opposition to Forest Clearcuts, Nat'l Env't Daily
(BNA) (Feb. 21, 1996».
161. Environmental Groups Blast Clinton, supra note 157 (statement by Robert
Sulnick, executive director, American Ocean Campaign).
162. Axline, supra note 4, at 637. The Supreme Court reviewed the reasons
behind the rules banning substantive riders in appropriations bills in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1978). [d. at 638.
163. [d. (citing CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANuAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS,
101ST CONG., rule XXI(2) (1991».
164. [d. at 637-38 (citing COMMITTEE ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S. SENATE, 102D
CONG., SENATE MANuAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAws, AND
RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, rule 16.2
(1992». In addition, rule 16.4 provides "[nlo amendment offered by any other Senator which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation bill, nor shall any amendment not germane or relevant to the subject matter
contained in the bill be received . ..." [d. at rule 16.4. (emphasis added).
165. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
166. Axline, supra note 4, at 638-39 (citing 141 Congo Rec. D347 (daily ed. Mar.
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rules were simply ignored. 167
In addition to the rules discussed above, senators are also
required to refer substantive matters to the appropriate oversight committees for their review. 16B In the case of the salvage rider, however, the appropriate congressional committees
never reviewed or debated the rider's merits. 169 In fact, the
accelerated process for appropriations bills allowed the sponsors of the rider to avoid answering questions about the fiscal
and environmental impacts of the rider. 170 Appropriations
bills almost always bypass the critical components of the legislative process, those designed to reveal misrepresentations and
erroneous interpretations based on ambiguous language. 171
Riders subsequently attached to these bills bypass important
committee hearings and other opportunities for debate. 172
Moreover, the rider attached to the 1995 Rescissions Act
was written by a committee which lacked the proper jurisdiction and the requisite experience in writing environmental
laws. 173 It was written ''behind closed doors, where the public
interest is most apt to be compromised by special interest
pleading."174 It is truly ironic that the branch of government

14, 1995». The Committee on Rules voted 9 to 3 to waive clause 2 of rule XXI.
ld. at 638 n.169.
Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.), then the chair of the Senate Appropriations
Committee and Senator Slade Gorton, the chair of the Interior and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, were two of the principle sponsors of the salvage rider. ld. at 639 n.173. Senator Hatfield has regularly
ignored the Senate rules prohibiting the attachment of substantive riders to appropriations bills. See Bolduan, supra note 4.
167. Axline, supra note 4, at 638.
168. Bolduan, supra note 4, at 370.
169. ld. The salvage rider should have been reviewed by the Senate Agricultural Committee and the House Agricultural and Interior Committees because it affected the Forest Service. Cf Bolduan, supra note 4, at 370 (discussing the committees that should have reviewed the riders detailed in the comment). Furthermore, because the rider exempted sales from various environmental laws, it should
have been reviewed by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. ld. Finally, since the rider
affected the jurisdiction of the federal courts to review agency action, it should
have been reviewed by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. ld.
170. Axline, supra note 4, at 639.
171. ld. at 638.
172. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1867.
173. ld.
174. ld. (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Stealth Attack: Gutting

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss1/5

28

Coldicott: Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program

1997] EMERGENCY SALVAGE TIMBER SALE PROGRAM

29

charged with making the rules which govern the conduct of
others is apparently not bound by the rules which govern its
own conduct. Private citizens cannot enforce House and Senate
rules and must rely on the lawmakers to police themselves. 175
For this reason alone, these lawmakers should be required to
adhere to the House and Senate rules and those rules should
not be waivable.
The effect of attaching the salvage rider to the Rescissions
Act, and thereby shielding it from appropriate committee hearings, was to reserve decisions concerning the use of public
forest lands to the Forest Service and the BLM.176 While
these agencies may have expertise in the area of timber sales,
"they are also bureaucratic hierarchies with relatively restricted missions and associated routines."177 More importantly,
these agencies are headed by officials who are not accountable
to the people. l7B Normally the administrative and judicial review processes would remedy this situation. In the case of the
salvage rider, however, the plain language of the statute eliminated those options. 179
B.

THE EFFECT ON PuBLIC PARTICIPATION

Since 1970, federal law has encouraged broad public par-

Environmental Protection Through the Budget Process (1995».
175. Axline, supra note 4, at 638.
176. Cf Bolduan, supra note 4, at 371 (explaining the effect of allowing previous riders to avoid committee hearings).
Senator Hatfield has thus moved forest management in
the [1990s], back to a 1930s New Deal ideal of environmental decision making. According to [the] New Deal
theory, agency experts should make decisions insulated
from both central and political control and judicial oversight. Only agency expertise could "creatively regulat[e] a
complex social problem in the public interest."
Id.(citations omitted).
177. Id. at 373.
178. See Kakuske, supra note 46.
179. § 1611(e), (0.
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ticipation in the development of environmental policy. ISO Similarly, Congress and the courts have encouraged private citizens to participate in the enforcement of those standards once
they have been promulgated. lSI Generally, administrative review of agency decisions has been readily available and judicial
review has been limited only by constitutional considerations
such as standing and ripeness. 182
The rider contained in the 1995 Rescissions Act represented a significant departure from existing environmental policy.183 The rider flatly prohibited administrative review and
arguably prohibited judicial review. l84 The rider did not contain its own citizen-suit provision and it specifically exempted
salvage timber and Option 9 sales from enforcement by any
other existing citizen-suit provisions with its broad declaration
that these sales automatically complied with all federal environmental and natural resource laws. 185 It is not surprising
that, having essentially lost the political and legal arenas,
many environmentalists feel they "have nothing left but the
court of public opinion and acts of civil disobedience. "186
180. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1860 (citing RoBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 716 (1992». Public participation can build credibility for
proposals, help identify issues through diversity of opinion and expertise, enhance
public understanding, and reduce costs and delays by resolving conflicts without
resort to litigation. Id. at 1864.
181. Id. Congress has recognized that the legitimacy of administrative decision
making is enhanced by opportunities for citizen litigation. Id. at 1874-75. For this
reason, Congress provided for citizen-suit provisions in the following federal environmental laws: The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994); the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1994); the Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1994);
the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988
& Supp. V 1993); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1988); the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988); and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety
Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2014 (1988). Id. at 1875 n.104.
182. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1860.
183. Id. at 1861.
184. § 1611(e), (0.
185. § 1611(i); see supra note 181.
186. Curt Wilson, Comment, The 1995 Salvage Timber Sale Rider: A Recipe for
Environmental Devastation, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 419 (1996) (quoting
Peter Seeth & Eric Gorski, U.S. Forest Service Goes on the Defensive, OREGONIAN,
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As one commentator argues, "Congress should not [be able
to] undermine the will of the people by indirectly attacking the
substance of popular environmental laws via manipulations of
the procedural provisions for public participation."187 Both
Congress and the public should have the opportunity to thoroughly debate any restrictions on public participation in environmental legislation. l88 In addition, impacts on the public'S
ability to voice its concerns at both the administrative and
judicial level should be minimized. 189
C.

MISREPRESENTATION

In addition to their disregard for congressional rules and
their effort to stifle public participation, the salvage rider's
sponsors seriously misrepresented the riders' impacts when
they presented it to their colleagues. 19o Representative Elizabeth Furse (D-Or.) circulated a memorandum to her colleagues
on December 19, 1995, identifying six ways in which Congress
was misled by the sponsors of the salvage logging rider. 191
The list begins with the sponsors' assurances that the rider
was an emergency measure to remove dead and dying
trees. 192 The rider has subsequently been used, however, to
Sept. 9, 1995, at AI).
187. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1862.
Those who have severely damaged this
nation's public and private forest lands, the
Forest Service and the timber industry, are
now being placed above the law so they can
continue to use the chain saw to "restore" the
forests they have destroyed. . . . All of the
current forestry bills rattling around Congress
would eviscerate those rights of meaningful
public participation that lie at the core of
American democracy.
Dorn, supra note 9, at 464 (quoting Oversight Hearing on the Administrative Appeals Process Before the Forest and Public Lands Subcomm. of the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Comm., 104th Congo (March 8, 1995) (statement of Barry
Rosenberg, Director of the Forest Watch Program of the Inland Empire Public
Lands Council».
188. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1862.
189. [d.
190. Axline, supra note 4, at 63l.
191. [d. at 631 n.121 (citing Rep. Elizabeth Furse, Furse Takes Lead in Repealing Timber Salvage Rider, Press Release (Dec. 7, 1995)). Representative Furse has
gathered more than 100 co-sponsors for a bill repealing the salvage rider. [d.
192. [d. The salvage logging rider addresses three categories of timber sales.
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clear-cut healthy forests. Second, the sponsors claimed the rider would create revenue for the U.S. Treasury.193 On the contrary, the rider will end up costing taxpayers billions of dollars. 194 Third, the sponsors told members of Congress the rider would help small businesses and landowners when, in reality, the rider will actually damage the property rights of private
timberland owners by driving down timber prices. 195 Fourth,
the sponsors insisted the rider would not harm threatened fish
and wildlife. 196 If that were the case however, it would not
have been necessary to suspend the laws that previously protected them. 197 Fifth, the sponsors assured Congress the rider
would speed implementation of President Clinton's Forest
Plan. 198 Instead, the rider has undermined the plan by requiring the cutting of old growth reserves which the Forest
Plan was designed to protect. 199 Finally, the sponsors stated
that the rider's section 318 sales provision would only speed
the harvest of a small number of old sales. 2 °O The Ninth Cir§ 1611(b), (d), (k). Only one category involves salvage sales, and the definition of
salvage under that category is broad enough to encompass healthy trees.
§ 1611(a), (b). The other two categories involve the sale of healthy trees.
§ 1611( d), (k).
193. Axline, supra note 4, at 631 n.121.
194. Id. According to the Wilderness Society, the rider will cost the federal
treasury an estimated $ 430 million to $ 1.5 billion. Dorn, supra note 9, at 479
(citing Hearings on Timber Salvage Before the House Salvage Timber & Forest
Health Task Force, 104th Congo (Dec. 19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth
Furse).
195. Axline, supra note 4, at 631 n.121.
196. Id.
197. For detailed lists of sales offered pursuant to the rider that will have
devastating impacts on ecosystems, see Western Ancient Forest Campaign, A Report to Congress and the American People on the Forest Health Rider (Jan. 5,
1996) and Headwaters, Timber Sale Victims of the Logging Without Laws Rider
(Nov. 30, 1995). Axline, supra note 4, at 629 n.10B.
19B. Id. at 631 n.121.
199. Id. at 629 n.10B.
200. Id. at 631 n.121. While some deliberations took place regarding the salvage
provisions contained in the rider, Congress paid little attention to the provisions
set forth in subsection (k) based on representations regarding its scope made by
the rider's sponsors. Dorn, supra note 9, at 472. Mere hours after President
Clinton singed the Rescissions Act into law, however, several of the rider's sponsors sent a letter to the Secretaries stating:
We want to make it clear that subsection (k) of the salvage legislation applies within the geographic area of
National Forest units and BLM districts that were subject
to Section 31B ... and within that geographic area requires the release of all previously offered or awarded
timber sales, including Section 318 sales as well as sales
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cuit has since interpreted the rider as applying to every timber
sale offered between October 1, 1990 and July 27, 1995 in
Oregon or Washington. 201
In addition to the misrepresentations explained by representative Furse, Senator Gorton also repeatedly assured Congress that immediate legislative action was necessary to "avoid
catastrophic wildfires and to promote forest health. "202 Subsequently, Senator Gorton admitted that "[t]he salvage legislation [was] about one thing and one thing only, and that [was]
jobs.,,203 The riders sponsors also claimed the salvage rider
was necessary to offset job losses within the timber industry
caused by reductions in federal timber supplies. 204 The sponsors blamed these reductions on the enforcement of various
environmental laws. 205 However, the enforcement of the
nation's environmental laws was only one of the many factors
offered or awarded in other years (such as Fiscal Years
1991-1995) that are not subject to Section 318. The reference to Section 318 in subsection (k)(1) defines the geographic area that is subject to subsection (k). . . . You
can expect our active oversight of your implementation of
the measure . . . . We expect each of you to provide us
with written assurances that your agencies intend to
implement Section [1611] in accordance with the direction
provided in this letter.
Axline, supra note 4, at 635 (quoting Letter from Senators Slade Gorton (RWash.), Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), & Larry Craig (R-Idaho), and Representatives Don Young (R-Alaska), Charles Taylor (R-N.C.), and Pat Roberts (R- Kan.), to
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman and Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt
(July 27, 1995». In addition, immediately after the rider's passage, the timber
industry filed a lawsuit asking the court to declare that the language in subsection (k) mandated the release of a similar group of sales. Dorn, supra note 9, at
473; see supra Part II.C.1. When the district court judge subsequently decided in
favor of the timber industry, seventeen members of Congress filed an amicus brief
in the Ninth Circuit declaring they did not intend subsection (k) to have such a
broad reach. Axline, supra note 4, at 632.
201. Axline, supra note 4, at 631 n.121.
202. [d. at 626 (quoting Letter from Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) to Members of the Interior Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (Mar.
20, 1995». Many scientists, scholars, and environmentalists have strongly denied
the existence of a "forest health crisis." Dorn, supra note 9, at 462.
203. Axline, supra note 4, at 626 n.80 (quoting Furse Seeks Logging Law Re·
peal, OREGONIAN, Dec. 8, 1995, at B3.)
204. Kriz, supra note 19 ("people in my state have been suffering because of a
lack of timber supply," Gorton said.).
205. As a result, § 1611(i) was included in the Rescissions Act to exempt salvage timber and Option 9 sales from all federal environmental and natural resource laws.
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leading to the decline in timber industry jobs. 206 Advances in
milling technology, the diversion of logs from mills to export
markets, and an overabundance of timber from nonfederal
sources have all contributed much more to the loss of jobs. 207
Moreover, Senator Gorton stated that the rider "provide[d]
the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management with the
necessary authority to conduct salvage timber sales to remove
dead, dying, bug infested and burned timber on federal lands
nationwide."208 The Forest Service and the BLM, however,
already had the authority to offer salvage sales independent of
the salvage logging rider.209 Finally, Senator Gorton claimed
that if the previously awarded sales covered by § 1611(k) were
not released, the federal government would be subject to damage claims of "well over $ 100 million."210 This statement was
disingenuous because Forest Service and BLM timber sale
contracts contain cancellation provisions that may be invoked
when necessary for environmental reasons. 211
Outraged by the numerous misrepresentations made by
the rider's sponsors, on December 7, 1995, Representative
Furse introduced H.R. 2745, the Restoration of Natural Re-

206. Axline, supra note 4, at 616-17, 622.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 626 (quoting Letter from Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash) to Members
of the Interior Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (Mar. 20,
1995».
209. Id. The National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994),
already authorizes the Forest Service to conduct salvage sales. Id. at 626 nn. 8183. The BLM has adopted similar regulations at 43 C.F.R. § 5473.4(d) (1995). Id.
210. Gorton & Kays, supra note 9, at 644.
211. Axline, supra note 4, at 634 n. 141. A 1994 Forest Service memo stated
the government would need $ 152 million to compensate loggers whose timber contracts had been set aside in Oregon and Washington. Kriz, supra note 19. However, $ 34 million was the figure estimated by the Congressional Research Service.
Id.
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source Law on the Public Lands Act. 212 As of July 9, 1996,
H.R. 2745 had 147 co-sponsors. 213 Unfortunately, no action
was taken on H.R. 2745 prior to the close of the 104th Congress. The bill is not likely to be reintroduced as the provisions
of the rider will have expired by December 31, 1996.
D.

'PLAIN LANGUAGE' AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN THE CONTEXT OF RIDERS

Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of
the statute. 214 In the case of the salvage rider, it has also
tended to end there. The courts have found the language in the
rider to be clear. In those instances where it has been necessary to look beyond the plain language of the rider's provisions,
the court has found that the congressional intent regarding
those provisions was also clear. But in reaching their decisions,
the courts have relied on language crafted to serve special
interests and congressional intent that was based on misrepresentation.
The courts have also relied heavily on statements made by
the rider's sponsors. While there may not be any doubt regarding the sponsors' intent however, the Ninth Circuit has noted
that "expressions of individual legislators' intent do not necessarily prove congressional intent."215 In the case of the salvage rider, there is substantial doubt as to what Congress
intended. It is true that the timber amendments did initially

212. Dorn, supra note 9, at 465 n.136; Restoration of Natural Resources Laws
on the Public Lands Act of 1995, H.R. 2745, 104th Congo (1995) [hereinafter H.R.
2745]. The bill would 1) amend federal law to repeal the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program, and 2) direct the Secretaries to suspend all activities being conducted pursuant to the authority provided by that program until it is determined
that the activity complies with all applicable environmental and natural resource
laws. H.R. 2745. Shortly after Furse introduced H.R. 2745, she received a letter,
written by an Oregon timber union official, warning her that her bill was "counterproductive to her current reelection campaign." Kriz, supra note 19.
213. H.R. 2745.
214. Oregon Natural Resources Council V. Thomas, No. 95-6272-HO 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19567, at *4 (D. Or. filed Dec. 5, 1995) (ONRC) (citing Chevron,
U.S.A, Inc. v. Nattiral Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
215. Bolduan, supra note 4, at 359 (citing Portland Audubon Soc'y V. Hodel, 866
F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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enjoy broad support from both Democrats and Republicans. 216
But given the congressional support for bill designed to repeal
the provisions of the rider, it can be inferred that the initial
support of many of the members of Congress was based on the
misrepresentations made by the rider's sponsors.217
Misrepresentations aside, if members of Congress continue
to waive House and Senate rules, their substantive riders
should not be allowed to hide behind the shield of the plain
language rule. Instead, the general rule for judicial interpretation should be a presumption of invalidity for any substantive
rider attached to an appropriations bill in violation of House
and Senate rules, whether validly waived or not. The presumption would be rebuttable, but in making its decision, the court
would be required to examine all the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the rider into law. Those circumstances
would include any misrepresentations made by the rider's
sponsors, the content and scope of the rider's provisions, including any suspension of current laws, and the degree to
which the proper committees and the public have been excluded from the process. Undoubtedly, the best rules are the ones
that are already in place, and if a new rule of judicial interpretation is not forthcoming, members of Congress simply should
not be allowed to waive the existing rules prohibiting the attachment of substantive riders to appropriations bills.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Fortunately, by the time this note is published, the salvage
logging rider will have expired. However, the contents of this
note are still highly relevant for at least three reasons. First,
although the rider expires on December 31, 1996, the Forest
Service can award contracts under the rider which extend
through September 30, 1997. 218 Second, some members of
Congress are actively seeking an extension of the rider, by
attaching yet another rider to a future appropriations bill. 219
216. Kriz, supra note 19.
217. Id.
218. § 1611(b)( 1).
219. Dorn, supra note 9, at 482 (citing Salvage Logging Law: GOPers Propose
Changes and Extension, GREENWlRE, Mar. 1, 1996). In 1996, legislation was introduced in the Senate to extend the provisions of the salvage logging rider for 10
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Third, the salvage logging rider was not the first example, nor
will it be the last, of the damage that can be done when certain members of Congress are allowed to waive or ignore
House and Senate rules. 220
House and Senate rules should not be waivable. If members of Congress are allowed to waive these rules, their efforts
should not be rewarded by allowing the laws they create to
hide behind the shelter of the plain language rule. When substantive riders are attached to appropriations bills, they should
be subject to a presumption of invalidity that can only be overcome by examining all of the circumstances surrounding the
rider from its conception to its application. This presumption
would be almost as difficult a barrier for members of Congress
to overcome as 'arbitrary and capricious' review is for persons
challenging the riders. Since "[r]iders that originate in the
dark of night are unlikely to look attractive in the light of
day,"221 exposure to "the light" in the form of a presumption
of invalidity would likely make the practice of attaching substantive riders to appropriations bills much less desirable. As a
result, the legislative process might once again serve the public
interest, not special interests.
VII.
A.

POSTSCRIPT
IDAHO SPORTING CONGRESS, INC. V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE

Soon after deciding ONRC II, the Ninth Circuit had another opportunity to visit arbitrary and capricious review of salvage timber sales. In Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. United
States Forest Service,222 the Idaho Sporting Congress (ISC)

years. Don Hopey, Vote Near on Rule Allowing More National Forest Logging; Environmentalists Condemn, Timber Firms Back Salvage Rider, PITISBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 29, 1996, at B-1. Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) has proposed Senate
Bill 391. [d. In addition to extending the provisions of the salvage rider, the bill
would set aside large tracts of national forest land as "logging priority zones."
Healthy trees located in logging priority zones could be cut along with dead and
dying trees. [d.
220. See generally, Bolduan, supra note 4.
221. Axline, supra note 4, at 638.
222. 92 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996) ([SC).
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alleged that, with respect to three forest projects and seven
associated timber sales, the Forest Service had violated the
Rescissions Act, the Administrative Procedure Act,223 a presidential directive,224 an interagency Memorandum of Agreemene25 concerning the implementation of the Rescissions
Act, and the public trust doctrine. 226 The court first held that
because § 1611(0 of the Rescissions Act provides a specific
mechanism for judicial review and offers a remedy, if appropriate, for every salvage timber sale, the APA is not applicable to

223. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (West 1996 & Supp. 1996).
224. In his directive the President stated:
I intend to carry out the objectives of the relevant timberrelated activities authorized by Public Law 104-19 [the
Rescissions Act]. I am also firmly committed to doing so
in ways that, to the maximum extent allowed, follow our
current environmental laws and programs. Public Law
104-19 gives us discretion to apply current environmental
standards to the timber salvage program, and we will do
so. With this in mind, I am directing each of you . . . to
move forward expeditiously to implement these timberrelated provisions in an environmentally sound manner, in
accordance with my Pacific Northwest Forest Plan, other
existing forest and land management policies and plans,
and existing environmental laws, except those procedural
actions prohibited by Public Law 104-19.
. . . I am directing that you enter into a Memorandum of Agreement . .. to make explicit the new
streamlining procedures, coordination, and consultation
actions that I have previously directed you to develop and
that you have implemented under existing environmental
laws.
ISC, 92 F.3d at 926.
225. The Memorandum of Agreement stated:
THE PARTIES AGREE TO
1. Comply with previously existing environmental laws except where expressly prohibited by Public Law 104-19,
notably in the areas of administrative appeals and judicial
review. In particular, the parties agree to implement
salvage sales under Public Law 104-19 with the same
substantive environmental protection as provided by otherwise applicable environmental laws and in accordance
with the provisions of this MOA.
2. . .. Adhere to the standards and guidelines in applicable Forest Plans and Land Use Plans and their amendments and related conservation strategies. . . .
Id. at 926; Memorandum of Agreement on Timber Salvage Related Activities Under Public Law 104-19, between United States Department of Agriculture, United
States Department of the Interior, United States Department of Commerce, United
States Environmental Protection Agency (Aug. 9, 1995).
226. ISC, 92 F.3d at 924.
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timber sales covered by the Rescissions Act.227 The court then
held that the sales did not violate the Rescissions Act because
they were not arbitrary and capricious. In addition, based on
its holding in Inland Empire Public Lands Council and the
plain language of the Rescissions Act, the court had no authority to review the Presidential directive or the Memorandum of
Agreement. Finally, because it lacked the authority to review
salvage timber sales covered by the Rescissions Act under any
other environmental law, the court could not consider ISC's
claim that the Forest Service breached its duty to protect the
public resource trust. 228
B.

SIERRA CLUB V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE

The scope of the language of the salvage timber sales provision was then litigated in Sierra Club v. United States Forest
Service. 229 In Sierra Club, the court was required to determine when "preparation" of a salvage timber sale ends for
purposes of the Rescissions Act.230 The action was a NEPA
challenge to several proposed salvage timber sales in the
Warner Creek area of Oregon. 231 After plaintiffs filed their
complaint, Congress passed the Rescissions Act, eliminating
the need to comply with NEPA when developing salvage timber sales. 232 The Act applied to all salvage timber sales "in
preparation" on the date of enactment. 233 On the date that
the Act went into effect, the Warner Creek sales were at two
different stages: a small portion of the timber had already been
advertised and offered, although not yet released, and the
remainder of the timber had completed the necessary reporting
procedures but had not yet been advertised. 234 With regard to
the advertised sales, the court found that § 1611(b) did not
apply, but that § 1611(k) mandated the release of those sales

227. [d. at 925.
228. [d. at 927-28.
229. 93 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1996) (Sierra Club).
230. [d. at 611. § 1611(b)(3) states: "Any salvage timber sale in preparation on
the date of the enactment of this Act [July 27, 1995] shall be subject to the provisions of this section." § 1611(b)(3) (emphasis added).
231. Sierra Club, 93 F.3d at 611.
232. [d.
233. § 1611(b)(3).
234. Sierra Club, 93 F.3d at 612.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

39

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5

40

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

and rendered plaintiff's NEPA claim moot. 235 With regard to
the unadvertised sales, the court found that Congress gave
"preparation" a special and specific meaning for the purposes
of the Act alone, and that meaning could be gleaned through
the use of the term elsewhere in the statute. 236 Accordingly,
the court held that § 161l(b) broadly applied to all salvage
timber sales which had not yet been advertised on the date of
the enactment, including the unadvertised sales at issue in the
case. 237
C.

SOUTHWEST
GLICKMAN

CENTER

FOR

BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY

V.

Finally, 42 days prior to the expiration of the salvage rider, the Ninth Circuit decided Southwest Center for Biological
Diversity v. Glickman. 238 In Southwest Center, the Center
filed an action claiming that a proposed salvage timber sale in
the Coronado National Forest violated the Rescissions Act
because the Biological Assessment and Evaluation (BA&E)
prepared by the Forest Service did not comply with the Act's
requirements. 239 In addition, the Center argued that conclusions contained in, and stemming from, the BA&E were arbitrary and capricious and that extra-record documents had been
erroneously struck by the district court. 240
The Forest Service had designated 69 of 27,500 acres
burned in a 1994 forest fire as suitable for salvage. 241 A
BA&E conducted by a· Forest Service biologist concluded that
the sale would have no effect on the Mexican Spotted Owl, an
endangered species. 242 This conclusion was in direct conflict
with an internal Fish and Wildlife Services policy.243 Based
on the "no effect" determination, and despite the conflict, the

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
H.A.l.

240.
241.
242.
243.

[d. at 614.
[d. at 612-13.
[d. at 613.

100 F.3d 1443 (9th Cir. 1996) (Southwest Center).
[d. at 1445. For a discussion of the Act's requirements, see supra Part

Southwest Center, 100 F.3d at 1445.
[d. at 1446.
[d.
[d.
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Forest Service categorically excluded the salvage sale from any
further environmental assessment under NEPA. 244
In affirming the lower court's decision, that failure to prepare an EAlBE was not a per se violation of the Rescissions
Act, the Ninth Circuit looked first to the adequacy of the Forest Service's documentation. 245 Finding that, in some cases,
NEPA allowed for the issuance of a categorical exclusion in
place of an EA and that the proposed sale met the criteria, the
Ninth Circuit held that the BA&E met the demands of the
Rescissions Act. 246 The court stated that "sections of a statute
generally should be read to give effect, if possible, to every
clause," and that where a statute is ambiguous, "the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."247 The court concluded that it must defer to the Secretary's decision that a document other than a combined EAlBE could be used to satisfy
the Act's requirements, provided the document complied with
NEPA and the ESA. 248
The Ninth Circuit next reviewed the Forest Service's conclusions. The Center argued that the Forest Service's disregard
of the Fish and Wildlife Service's Mexican Spotted Owl policy
constituted a failure to consider an important aspect of the
problem and was thus arbitrary and capricious. 249 Despite
the Forest Service's commitment to the Memorandum of Agreement, the Ninth Circuit found that the Forest Service had no
obligation to consider other agencies' views because the Memorandum was not legally binding. 250 The court also cited its
previous decision in Inland Empire for its conclusion that the
Secretary had discretion to disregard the effect of a salvage
sale on an endangered species. 251

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

[d.
[d.
[d.

Southwest Center, 100 F.3d at 1448.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1449.
[d.
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the exclusion of a letter
from the Regional Forester to the Forest Supervisors detailing
"interagency consultation procedures required for compliance
with the ESA in salvage timber sales under the Rescissions
Act," because it was issued one month after the approval of the
proposed sale. 252 Similarly, several maps and declarations
were struck because the information they contained was duplicated elsewhere in the record. 253
Julie A. Coldicott"

252. Southwest Center, 100 F.3d at 1449.
253. Id.
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